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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State of Adawa has, by application pursuant to Article 31(1) of this
Court's Statute, instituted proceedings against the Republic of Rasasa with
regard the dispute concerning violations of international law by the Republic
of Rasasa and invoked the compromissory clause of the 1929 Treaty of
Botega. On 9 September 2019, the Parties have jointly notified to the Court
a Statement of Agreed Facts.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
Whether or not the Court lacks jurisdiction over Adawa's claims and if
Adawa is a party to the 1929 Treaty of Botega;
H.
Whether or not Rasasa's development and deployment of the WALL along
the border between Adawa and Rasasa is consistent with international law;
11I.
Whether or not Adawa's claim that Rasasa's Helian tariffs violate the CHC
Treaty falls outside the Court's jurisdiction or is inadmissible; and, in the
alternative, if the imposition of the tariffs violates the CHC Treaty; and
IV.
Whether or not Adawa's arrest and detention of Darian Grey constitute





The State of Adawa and the Republic of Rasasa are neighboring
countries in the Crosinian Region, sharing a 201 kilometers long border.
There are other four States in the Crosinian Region, being the only place on
Earth where the Helian hyacinth is cultivated.
All six Crosinian States were provinces of the Kingdom of Crosinia
until 1928, when they divided. Rasasa declared its independence, and the
provinces of Adawa and Zeitounia united to form the Adawa-Zeitounia
Union "("AZU").
In 1929, Rasasa and AZU, signed the Treaty of Botega on Armistice
and Pacification (the "Treaty of Botega"). On 1 January 1939, Adawa and
Zeitounia amicably agreed to dissolve their Union, and each declared its
independence as of that date.
On 20 June 1969 the six Member States signed a Treaty declaring the
formation of the Crosinian Helian Community ("CHC"). The parties to the
CHC agreed to impose no customs duties within the CHC on Helian spice or
the equipment and materials used to harvest or process the Helian hyacinth.
For the next ten years, the Helian exports flourished in all CHC Member
States. Until the 14 July 2012, when an unprecedented and catastrophic
tropical cyclone, Hurricane Makan, struck the entire Region. A great amount
of Helian hyacinths were destroyed. As a consequence, unemployment began
to increase, and crime rates skyrocketed throughout the Region. Armed
gangs roamed the countryside, stealing salvageable Helian plants and
harvesting and processing equipment from the devastated farms.
In October 2012, the President of Rasasa, Beta Tihmar, convened a
meeting of major Rasasan corporate executives to elicit ideas on how to
address the increasingly serious crime wave that the police had been unable
to staunch.
In that meeting, Ms. Grey, the chief executive officer of the Rasasan
Robotics Corporation ("RRC"), proposed the development of a ground-
breaking autonomous security system to suppress criminal activities in
Rasasa and throughout the Region. She called it the "Weaponized
Autonomous Limitation Line" ("WALL"), an autonomous weapon system
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that would deploy advanced technology to deter and apprehend criminals,
while using force only when absolutely necessary. Moreover, the WALL
featured an advanced form of "supervised learning," in which the training
data had been "tagged" by teams of software engineers from RRC working in
cooperation with Rasasan police officers and military officials. The tagging
highlighted aspects of the training data that indicated armed threats, as well
as indicators of factors that would render an individual effectively hors de
combat.
In January 2013 President Tihmar notified the other five CHC Member
States that Rasasa had contracted with RRC to undertake research and
development of the WALL and all six CHC Member States got involved with
the research and development phase of the project.
By April 2013, police in the other four Crosinian States had gained the
upper hand, and crime levels were restored to pre-Hurricane Makan levels.
Each of these States gradually withdrew from the WALL project. By August
2013, only Rasasa and Adawa continued to participate in the development of
the venture.
On 6 July 2015, Ms. Grey announced the completion of the project.
Both Adawa and Rasasa stated that it was neither economically feasible nor
politically desirable to go further with the project.
In August 2016, the Rasasan Border Police reported that "the small
Adawan gangs that arose in the wake of Hurricane Makan have apparently
organized themselves into large armed groups, and have turned the resources,
personnel, and weapons they previously used for localized crimes towards
cross-border crime into Rasasa."
Mr. Pindro was elected president of Rasasa and took office in January
2017. He appointed Darian Grey as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Rasasan
human rights groups protested Ms. Grey's appointment as Foreign Minister,
and the opposition party in parliament was unanimous in voting against it. It
must be noted that in August 2009 the International Criminal Court had
started an investigation concerning war crimes and crimes against humanity
that were alleged to have occurred during the 2007-2009 civil war in the State
of Garantia, and in the referral Ms. Grey was specifically cited as responsible
for the RRC activities there.
Shortly after taking office, President Pindro submitted two bills for
legislative approval. The first provided for the introduction of tariffs of 25%
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ad valorem on Helian bulbs, live plants, and pollen imported into Rasasa.
The second called for expedited review of options for the hardening of the
Adawa-Rasasa border.
On 25 June 2017, President Pindro authorized the deployment of the
Rasasan Army against the militia camps within Rasasa, as well as the
purchase of the WALL from RRC and its installation along the Rasasa-
Adawa border. President Pindro announced the completed installation of the
WALL on 10 January 2018.
In January 2018, Rasasa's Parliament had, with little debate, adopted
President Pindro's proposal to impose tariffs on unprocessed Helian
materials imported into Rasasa. Adawa protested the decision and reminded
Rasasa of its obligations under article 3 of the CHC treaty.
In October 2018, Adawa formally requested consultations with Rasasa
in the WTO. Government officials from both Adawa and Rasasa met, but
were unable to resolve the dispute amicably.
In January 2019, the International League for the Support of Agriculture
(ILSA) published a study that presented comprehensive and detailed
evidence that, as a direct result of the tariffs imposed by Rasasa in January
2018, Adawan farmers were estimated to have lost more than 10 million in
revenue through the end of the studied period in October 2018 as a result of
declining sales to processors in Rasasa. It projected that the losses would
increase in coming years.
In February 2019, Adawa requested the establishment of a panel
pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, alleging that Rasasa's tariffs on' Helian
products were an unjustifiable breach of its commitment to maintain the
bound rate of zero on such items.
On 13 April 2019, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
announced that, pursuant to Article 58 of the Rome Statute, she was
requesting the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Minister Grey, assigning
to her criminal responsibility for certain alleged activities of RRC in
Garantia. The charged acts included war crimes, and "other serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable to armed conflicts not of an
international character," within Articles 8.2(c) and 8.2(e) ofthe Rome Statute.
The indictment specifically cited the training and supervision of paramilitary
forces that perpetrated such crimes, the sale and use of prohibited weapons
systems, and the conduct of unauthorized surveillance of civilians that
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allegedly led to their becoming the targets of violent repression.
On 18 June 2019, the CHC held its annual meeting in Adawa. Minister
Grey, representing Rasasa, arrived on the 18 June 2019. Two days later, a Pre-
Trial Chamber of the ICC granted the Prosecutor's request and issued a
warrant of arrest for Minister Grey under Article 89 of the Rome Statute.
Two days later, on 22 June 2019, officers of the Novazora police approached
Minister Grey as she was leaving her hotel. After ascertaining her identity,
they took her into custody.
On 1 July 2019, after negotiations between the parties, Adawa submitted




The State of Adawa submits that this High Court has jurisdiction over
Adawa's claim since Adawa is a party to the 1929 Treaty of Botega. This is
due to the fact that Adawa automatically succeeded to all of the Adawan-
Zeitounia Union's treaties following its dissolution in 1939; or in any event,
the Treaty of Botega automatically continued in force since it establishes a
territorial regime. Notification of succession to Rasasa was not required
under international law. Alternatively, Rasasa tacitly consented to the
continuity of the Treaty of Botega.
I.
With regards to the development of the WALL, it is submitted that it is
attributable to Rasasa and that it violates the new weapons review customary
obligation. Rasasa cannot allege Adawa has no clean hands since it is not a
principle under international law. Regarding the deployment of the WALL
along the shared border, Adawa submits that it violates international law.
First, because it constitutes a prohibited threat of use of force against
Adawa's territorial integrity and the demarcation lines established in the
Treaty of Botega. Second, because it violates the human right to life and
effective remedies of Adawan nationals under the ICCPR. Third, if the Court
considers that there is a non-international armed conflict, the WALL violates
the international humanitarian law. Consequently, the Court should the
immediate dismantlement and removal of the WALL.
M.
Regarding Rasasa's imposition of tariffs on Helian products, Adawa
contends that this Court has jurisdiction since there is no normative conflict
between the CHC Treaty and the GATT; and Adawa's claim is admissible
either because there is no rule of lis pendens under international law or
because its requirements are not met in the present case. Moreover, Adawa
contends that the imposition of tariffs is inconsistent with article 3 of the CHC
Treaty. Adawa further submits that the essential security interest clause
enshrined in article 22(b) of the CHC Treaty is not self-judging and that
Rasasa cannot rely on it to justify non- compliance. Alternatively, Rasasa
cannot plea state of necessity as a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness.
As a result, Adawa is entitled to compensatory damages derived from
Rasasa's violation of its international obligations.
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IV.
Finally, Adawa submits that the arrest and detention of Darian Grey
were consistent with Adawa's obligations under international law since Ms.
Grey does not enjoy immunity under international law. First, because there
is a there is an exception to immunities of public officials with respect to
prosecution by international courts under customary law. Second, because
Ms. Greys immunities are overridden by the jus cogens status of the
prohibition of war crimes. Third, because her immunities were lifted under
the abuse of rights doctrine. Furthermore, Adawa was obliged to prosecute
or extradite Ms. Grey pursuant to the aut dedere aut judicare principle.
Alternatively, Adawa argues that had to execute the arrest warrant
notwithstanding conflicting obligations since the ICC is the sole authority to
decide over its judicial functions. In the further alternative, Adawa acted as
an agent of the ICC when arresting Ms. Grey. Therefore, Adawa may
proceed to render Ms. Grey to the ICC.
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PLEADINGS
A. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER ADAWA'S CLAIMS BECAUSE ADAWA IS
A PARTY TO THE 1929 TREATY OF BOTEGA.
I. Adawa automatically succeeded to the 1929 Treaty of Botega.
a) IN CASES OF DISSOLUTION, ALL BILATERAL TREATIES
AUTOMATICALLY SUCCEED.
Under customary international law, when States dissolve and cease to
exist, leading to the creation of new States on their original territory,'
bilateral treaties in force at the date of the succession automatically succeed.2
This rule is supported by both State practice and opinio juris.3
State practice is evinced by the dissolution of the Union of Colombia, 4
the Norway and Sweden Union, the Austro-Hungarian Empire,6 the Island-
Denmark Real Union,7 the Federation of Mali,8 and the United Arab
Republic.9
Evidence of opinio juris, arising from official publications, diplomatic
correspondence and national legislation stating that a given practice is
1. Draft Articles on Succession of States in respect of Treaties with commentaries, Report of
the ILC 26th sess., GAOF, 29* Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/29/10) 265; Legality of Use of Force (Serb. and
Montenegro v. Can.) 2004 L.C.J. (Dec. 15) (Separate opinion of judge Elaraby) ["Use of Force, Elaraby"],
512; J. CRAWFORD, STATE PRACTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO SECESSION 92 (2014).
2. Int'l Law Comm'n, Yearbook ofthe ILC (1974), UN.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.] (Part
1) 265; J. Mervyn Jones, State Succession in the Matter of Treaties, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 360 (1947)
["Mervyn Jones"], 374.
3. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, ["ICJ Statute"]
Article 38 (1)(b); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Neth.), 1968 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 26), ¶¶74, 77.
4. Mervyn Jones, supra note 2, 368.
5. Id.
6. Int'l Law Comm'n, Yearbook of the ILC (1970), UN.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970Add. (vol.
II) ["Yearbook 1970"]123.
7. Yearbook 1970 supra note 6,122; Mervyn Jones, supra note 2, 369.
8. Int'l Law Comm'n, Yearbook of the ILC (1971), UN.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1971/Add.l (vol.
II) (Part 2) ["Yearbook 1971"]146.
9. Yearbook 1971, supra note 8, 142.
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binding under customary international law,10 conforms the practice of
automatic succession."
After the Adawa-Zeitounia Union ["AZU"] was dissolved into two
independent States in 1939,12 Adawa and Zeitounia automatically succeeded
to all of the AZU's treaties, including the Treaty of Botega.
b) IN ANY EVENT, AUTOMATIC CONTINUITY APPLIES TO TREATIES
ESTABLISHING TERRITORIAL REGIMES
Even if this Court considers that a successor State does not
automatically succeed to all of its predecessor's treaties,13 there is a
customary exception of automatic continuity regarding treaties establishing
territorial regimes, inter alia, boundary and demilitarization treaties.
Therefore, Adawa automatically succeeded.
(i) The Treaty of Botega is a boundary treaty
Treaties establishing boundaries and their respective ancillary
provisions, such as dispute settlement mechanisms, remain in force
notwithstanding any State succession. 4 This Court," the U.N. Security
Council' 6 and scholars" have recognized that armistice demarcation lines are
tantamount to boundaries, since they delineate the territory, bind the parties
10. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law with
commentaries, A/73/10 (2018), 141.
11. Syrian Arab Republic - Legislative Decree 25 of 13 June 1962, Article I; France - Journal
Officiel de la Republique Frangaise, Lois et Decrets, Paris 2 June 1961; Nations, Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary-General, Historical Information. Note of Czech Republic to the UN.
12. Statement of Agreed Facts [SAF] 17.
13. P. Dumberry, State Succession to Bilateral Treaties: A Few Observations on the Incoherent
and Unjustifiable Solution Adopted for Secession and Dissolution of States under the 1978 Vienna
Convention, 28 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 13 (2014) 14.
14. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946
U.N.T.S. 3 ["VCSST"], Article 11; Draft Articles on Succession of States in respect of Treaties with
commentaries, Report of the ILC, 26" sess., GAOF, 290 Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/29/10) ["VCSST
commentaries"] 201; A. ZIMMERMANN, Secession and the law of State succession in M. KOHEN (ED),
SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES, 215-216 (2006).
15. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion 2004 I.C.J. (Jul. 9) ["Wall Advisory Opinion"] ¶72-76.
16. S.C. Res. 95, 10-11 (Sep. 1, 1951).
17. Y. DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 46 (2011); H. S. Levie, The Nature
and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 T HE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 880 (1956),
890.
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indefinitely and can only be modified by mutual consent." The mere fact
that armistice lines are established "without prejudice" to their ultimate
settlement do not alter their permanent character. 19
In the case at bar, the Treaty of Botega is a boundary treaty since it
established an Armistice Demarcation Line between the contracting parties.20
(ii) The Treaty of Botega is a demilitarization treaty
As recognized by this Court, treaties creating obligations or restrictions
upon the use of a territory for the benefit of a group of Sates are not affected
by a State succession. 21 Demilitarization treaties, which separate the armed
forces of former belligerent parties, 22 are typically regarded as treaties
attaching obligations to a particular territory23 and thus continuing ipso jure
after a State succession. 4
The Treaty of Botega is a demilitarization treaty since its object and
purpose is the cessation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace and
security in the general interest of the peoples of Crosinia through the
establishment of an armistice. 2 5 The treaty's text supports this interpretation,
for it establishes Demarcation Lines to separate the armed forces of the
parties,26 thus imposing restrictions upon the use of the territory.
c) NOTIFICATION OF SUCCESSION IS NOT REQUIRED
Respondent may allege that notification by a successor State expressing
its consent to be bound by a bilateral treaty is required under international
law. However, notifications, unilateral declarations, devolution agreements
and other means to demonstrate that the successor State is obliged by its
18. Y. Dinstein, war, aggression and self-defence 46 (2011)
19. Y. Dinstein, Demarcation Line, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
20. Botega Treaty, Article 1.
21. VCSST, supra note 14, Article 12; Gaboikovo- Project (Hung. v. Slo) 1997
I.C.J. (Sep. 25) ["Gaboikovo"] ¶152.
22. J. Von Bernstorff, Demarcation Line, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
(2010), ¶1.
23. VCSST commentaries, supra note 14, 197; J. CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 439 (2012).
24. M. CRAVEN, THE DECOLONIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATE SUCCESSION AND THE
LAW OF TREATIES, 188-189 (2007).
25. Botega Treaty, Preamble.
26. Botega Treaty, Article I.
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predecessor's obligations have a mere confirmatory character.27 In cases of
dissolution, the successor State automatically assumes the treaty obligations
of its predecessor even in the absence of such notification.28 Thus, Adawa's
lack of notification does not bar the continuity of the Treaty of Botega.
II. Alternatively, Rasasa acquiesced to Adawa's claim of succession
According to the principle of acquiescence, 29 silence or inaction by a
State after a reasonable period of time is interpreted as consent30 when a
response expressing objection in relation to a declaration of another State
would be called for.3 ' The need for a response is particularly required when
such declaration specially affects the silent State's interests or rights.32
Here, Rasasa was specially affected by President Moraga's declaration
regarding the violation of the Treaty of Botega by the installation of the
WALL.33 This declaration was public and addressed to President Pindro,
thus giving Rasasa ample opportunity to object to the continuity of the Treaty
of Botega. Therefore, Rasasa consented to Adawa's claim of succession.
IH. The Court has jurisdiction over Adawa's claim
As a successor State of the AZU, Adawa is a party to the Treaty of
Botega. Pursuant to Article VI of such Treaty and Article 36(5) of this Court's
Statute, this Court has jurisdiction over Adawa's claims3 4
27. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croat. v. Serb.) 2008 I.C.J. 595 (Nov. 18) 1109; B. Stern, Questions choisies, 262 RC.A.D.I 233 (1996)
253.
28. Use of Force, Elaraby, supra note 1, 1511; International Law Association, ILA Resolution
on Aspects on the Law on State Succession, 73 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE (2008) ¶4.
29. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. (December 18) ¶138-139; Delimitation of
the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.) 1984 ICJ (Oct. 12) ["Gulf of Maine"]
1130; Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.)
2008 ICJ (May 23) 1121.
30. Gulf of Maine, supra note 29, 1130.
31. J. CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 419 (2012)
["CRAWFORD"]; N. S. Marques Antunes, Acquiescence, Max Planck Encyclopedia ofPublic International
Law, (2006)121.
32. CRAWFORD, supra note 31, 419; P. DUMBERRY, A GUIDE TO STATE SUCCESSION IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 85 (2018).
33. SAF $38.
34. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, Article 36(5).
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B. RASASA'S DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE
WALL ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN ADAWA AND RASASA
IS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE WALL
MUST BE DISMANTLED AND REMOVED FORTHWITH
L The development of the WALL violates international law
a) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WALL IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO RASASA
The conduct of a private company is attributable to the State when it is
performed under the State's instructions, directions or control.3 5 The terms
"instructions", "direction" and "control" are disjunctive, hence it is sufficient
to establish one of them.36
Here, Rasasa instructed the RCC to develop the WALL37 and directed
every other instance of the project, including the tagging of training data and
the field tests. Hence, the development is attributable to Rasasa.
b) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WALL VIOLATES THE WEAPONS
REVIEW OBLIGATION
According to customary law, States are obliged to review the legality of
new means and methods of warfare,38 as evidenced by State practice39 and
opiniojuris.40 This review has to take into account the foreseeable use of the
weapon.4 1
Rasasa's review considered the potential use of the WALL in an armed
conflict -as evidenced by RCC's reference to individuals "hors de
35. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda) 2005 1.C.J. 168 (Dec.
19) ["Armed Activities"], J1 75-176.
36. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act with commentaries,
adopted by the ILC at its 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) ["ARSI WA commentaries"], 48.
37. SAF ¶19.
38. W. Boothby, weapons and the law of armed conflicts 249 (2016) ["boothby"].
39. 1. Daoust, New wars, new weapons? The obligation of States to assess the legality of means
and methods of warfare, 84 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 345 (2012), 354-357; ICRC,
A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 931 (2006),
933, 934.
40. Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, WeaponsReview Mechanisms
Submitted by the Netherlands and Switzerland, CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.5, ¶18 (Nov. 7, 2017).
41. BOOTHBY, supra note 38, 347.
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combat"4 2 when presenting the weapon- but not as border control system in
a law enforcement situation. Therefore, Rasasa's review does not meet the
standard required by customary international law.
c) RASASA CANNOT ALLEGE THE CLEAN HANDS PRINCIPLE
Rasasa cannot allege "clean hands", as it is not a principle under
international law43 and this Court has declined to consider it on several
opportunities."
II. The deployment of the Wall violates international law.
a) THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE WALL VIOLATES ARTICLE 2(4) OF
THE U.N. CHARTER
Under Article 2(4) ofthe U.N. Charter, States shall refrain from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity of other States.4 5 Territorial
integrity relates to the exclusive sovereignty of a State over its own
territory." A threat of force can consist in the possibility of cross-border use
of weapons4 7 and the concentrations of troops along borders," as evidenced
42. SAF 120.
43. Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. Russia, Final Award, P.C.A. Case No.2005-
05/AA228, Jul. 18, 2014, 1 1358; James Crawford (Special Rapporteur) 2 nd Report on State
Responsibility, UN Doc A/CN.4/498 and Add.1-4 ( Jul. 19, 1999), 83; B. BOLLECKER- STERN, LE
PREJUDICE DANS LA THEORIE DE LA RESPONSABILIT INTERNATIONAL 312 (1973).
44. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003, I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6), 1100; Wall Advisory Opinion, supra
note 15,¶ 63.
45. Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, ["U.N. Charter"], Article 2(4); G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
46. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) ["Nicaragua
1209; S. Blay, Territorial Integrity and Political Independence, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (2010), 18.
47. G. NOLTE & A. RANDELZHOFER, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breachesof
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 51, in B. SIMMA et al (EDS), THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II, 1410(2012).
48. J. GREEN, F. GRIMAL, The Threat of Force as an Action in Self-Defense Under International
Law, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285 (2011) 297.
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by the State practice of Turkey,49 Yugoslavia, 50 Pakistan'", Iraq 2 and the
Soviet Union. 53  Furthermore, this Court has acknowledged that military
maneuvers near a State border may amount to a threat of force. 54 Rasasa's
deployment of hundreds of autonomous armed towers along the entire 201-
kilometer shared border,5 5 equipped and authorized to use force against
Adawan territory and people, 56 constitutes a prohibited threat to use force in
violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
b) THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE WALL VIOLATES THE TREATY OF
BOTEGA
The Treaty of Botega establishes a general armistice with aview towards
regional peace as well as demarcation lines to minimize the possibility of
friction and incidents.57 It is understood that an armistice consists of a
suspension of military operations. 58 Accordingly, States must refrain from
the threat of use of force to violate armistice demarcation lines. 59
Respondent placed in the Adawan-Rasasan border a weapon capable of
deploying force beyond the demarcation lines. This constitutes a threat to
use force60 contrary to Article I of the Treaty of Botega.
c) THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE WALL VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
49. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Suppl. 1964-1965, XVI, 238 S. (Sales
No. 1968. VI I. 1). Doc. ST/PSCA/l/Add. 4., 202 (1968).
50. U.N.S.C., Letter dated 1 February 1999 from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent
Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N Doc.
S/1999/107 (Feb. 2, 1999); U.N.S.C., Letter dated 5 February 1999 from the Charge D'Affaires A.l. of the
Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/118 (Feb. 4, 1999).
51. U.N.S.C., Cablegram dated 15 July 1951 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to
the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2245 (Jul. 15, 1951).
52. S.C. Res. 949, (Oct. 15, 1994).
53. A. De Luca, Soviet- American Politics and the Turkish Straits, 92 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 503
(1977), 516-20.
54. Nicaragua, supra note 46, 1227.
55. SAF ¶2.
56. SAF ¶37.
57. Botega Treaty, Article I.
58. U.K. - Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 263
59. G.A. Res. 2625, (Oct. 24 1970).
60. Supra §(11)(B)(1).
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(i) Adawa has standing to bring this claim
Adawa complies with the requirements to exercise diplomatic
protection 61 since (i) the WALL affects Adawan nationals; 62 and (ii)
exhaustion of local remedies is not required when no relevant connection
exists between the injured individuals and the responsible State. 63
(ii) International human rights law is applicable
A non-international armed conflict ["NIAC"] exists when organized
armed groups engage in protracted and intense armed violence with the
State." Banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections do not amount
to a NIAC. 65 The isolated attacks to the Rasasan Border Police stations does
not reach a NIAC's threshold.
(iii) ICCPR applies extraterritorially
States must protect human rights of individuals within their territory and
under their jurisdiction. 66 Extraterritorial jurisdiction exists when a State's
actions produce effects outside its territory. 67  Here, the WALL has the
potential to injure and even kill people in Adawan territory, 68 thus the ICCPR
applies.
(iv) Rasasa violates the right to life
61. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Report of the ILC, 58' Sess. G.A. 63"' Sess. Supp.
No. 10 A/61/10 ["Draft Articles on Diplomatic. Protection"], Articles 1, 3, 14; Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Act adopted by the ILC at its 53rd Sess., annexed to G.A. Res.
56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) ["ARSIWA"], Article 44 (b).
62. SAF 1137-38.
63. Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, supra note 61, Article 15(c); Trail smelter case,
Award, (U.S v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1961
64. International Law Association, Final Report on The Meaning of Armed Conflict in
International Law (Aug. 2010), http://www.ila-hq.org, p.2; The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction Appeal Chamber, I.C.T.Y. Case No. IT-94-1-
AR72 Oct.2, 1995, 170.
65. The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, Trial Chamber IC.T.Y., Case No. IT-94-1-T, May 7,
1997 ¶562.
66. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 19, 1966) 999 U.N.T.S.171
["ICCPR"), Article 2(1); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 1996 1.C.J. (July 11) ["Genocide"] 131.
67. Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, No. 12747/87 E.Ct.H.R. (Jun. 26, 1992), 191.
68. SAF 137.
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Under Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, States cannot engage in conducts that
may arbitrarily deprive life, 69 even if such conducts do not result in loss of
life. 70 Potential use of force in law enforcement situations is only lawful
when there is an imminent threat to life.7' Border control, 72 disobeying a
warning,73 the suspected possession of a weapon 74 or wearing an "enemy"
uniform 5 do not justify use of lethal force.
Moreover, the imminence requirement is extremely strict,76 meaning "a
matter of seconds, not hours".77 LAWS employed with algorithmic tagging
to identify objectives and authorize use of force violate this requirement since
threats are identified in advanced,when there is no "imminent" emergency to
response.78
The WALL uses algorithmic tagging to establish threats,79 and forcibly
prevent illegal border-crossings in either direction of the Adawan-Rasasan
border.80 Accordingly, individuals not presenting any imminent threat to life
might be arbitrarily killed. The fact that the WALL deploys force as a last
69. ICCPR, supra note 66, Article 6; Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36, U.N.
Doc CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018), ¶7.
70. Benzer and others v. Turkey, No. 23502/06 E.Ct.H.R (Mar. 24, 2014), ¶163; Andreou v.
Turkey, No. 45653/99 E.Ct.H.R. (Oct. 27,2009),146; D. MURRAY, Conduct of Hostilities and Targeting
in E. WILMSHURT et al(ED.), PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 119-
120(2016).
71. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, United Nations Basic Principles
on the Use ofForce and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, (1990),¶9; Landaeta Mejlas Brothers et al.
v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 281, (Aug. 24, 2014) 1131; Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions), Twenty-fifth session of the Human Right Council, UN Doc. A/HR/C/26/36 (April 1,
2014) ["Heyns"] 159.
72. Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Nos. 34044/96,35532/97 and 44801/98 E.Ct.H.R.
(Mar. 22, 2001), ¶73.
73. Kakoulli v. Turkey, No 38595/97 E.Ct.H.R. (Nov. 22, 2005), ¶119.
74. Kallis and Androulla Panayi v. Turkey, No 45388/99 E.Ct.H.R. (Oct.27, 2009), ¶60.
75. Id.
76. G. Gaggioli, "The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Conduct of Hostilities, Law
Enforcement and Self-Defense" in C. FORD, W. WILLIAMS, COMPLEX BATTLESPACES: THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN WARFARE 76 (2019).
77. Heyns, supra note 71, ¶59
78. M. Brehm, Defending the Boundary: Constraints and Requirements on the Use of
Autonomous Weapon Systems Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law,9 GENEVA
ACADEMY BRIEFING 3 (2017) ["Brehm"] 24.
79. SAF 120
80. SAF 1137,39
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resort and guarantees that law-abiding citizens will not be harmed8 ' does not
render it lawful since "every human being" has the inherent right to life, not
just innocent civilians.82 Consequently, Rasasa violated the right to life.
(v) Rasasa violated the right to remedy
Effective remedies8 3 includes the State's obligation to prosecute and
punish those accountable for human rights violations.84 In the case of LAWS,
individual accountability for arbitrary deprivation of life is not possible, 85
since the weapon cannot be punished nor deterred. 86  Moreover,
dismantlement of the weapon is not an effective remedy for victims seeking
retribution.87
The WALL's potential use of force together with lack of any human
control violates the right to an effective remedy, since no actor would be
directly criminally responsible for human right violations.
d) IN ANY EVENT, THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE WALL VIOLATES IHL
(i) The WALL violates principles of targeting
The distinction principle mandates that attacks may only be directed
against military targets and objectives.88 Weapons programmed to target on
the basis of observable, behavioral or other "signatures" do not comply with
81. SAF ¶37
82. ICCPR, supra note 66, Article 1.
83. ICCPR, supra note 66, Article 2(3).
84. B. Docherty, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 1
(2012) 42; D. Hammond, Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State Accountability, 15 CHICAGO
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 652 (2015) 662; U. C. Jha, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems and
International Humanitarian Law, 16 ISIL Y.B. INT'L HUMAN. & REFUGEE L. 112 (2016-2017) 125.
85. Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions),
Twenty-third session of the Human Right Council, UN Doc. A/HR/C/23/47 (April 9, 2013) ¶76.
86. C. Heyns, Human Rights and the use of Autonomous Weapons Systems During Domestic
Law Enforcement, 38 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 350 (2016) 373; B. Docherty, Losing Humanity: The
Case against Killer Robots, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 1 (2012) 44.
87. B. Docherty, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 1
(2012) 45.
88. J. HENCKAERTS, L. DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW




this principle, since they do not map exactly onto the defmitions of persons
or objects that may be made the object of attack under IHL. 89
Moreover, under the principle of proportionality, civilian damage must
not be excessive in relation to the concrete military advantage anticipated
from the attack as a whole.9 0 Such balance requires a subjective judgment
between military advantage and humanitarian concerns.91
Finally, the precaution principle obliges States to do everything feasible
to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not
military. 92 This requires human agents to retain sufficient control to identify
changing circumstances and make adjustments in a timely manner.9 3
The WALL cannot distinguish between civilian and military targets
since it is programmed to target whatever its algorithm -based on tagged
"signatures" 94 - interprets as an armed threat.9 5 Further, the WALL lacks
meaningful human control to strike the subjective balance to weight
damages. 96
Consequently, the WALL violates the principles of necessity,
proportionality and precaution.
(ii) The WALL cannot determine the applicable body of law
During the conduct of hostilities, human control over LAWS is required
to shift to a law enforcement model when the circumstances so require.97 The
89. K. Benson, 'Kill 'em and Sort it Out Later:' Signature Drone Strikes and International
Humanitarian Law, 27 PACIFIC MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUSINESS & DEVELOPMENTLAW JOURNAL 17 (2014),
49.
90. D. Tharer, International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context, 338 RC.A.D.I 9,
74 (2008); J. HENCKAERTS, L. DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL
I, 173, 175 (2009); S. Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in D. FLECK, (ED.) THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 119 (2009) 186; W. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a
Punishable Offense, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 53 (1997) 548.
91. The Prosecutor v. Galid, Judgment and Opinion, Trial Chamber I, L.C.T.Y., Case No. IT-
98-29-T, Dec. 5, 2003, ¶58.
92. J.-m.henckaerts & I.doswald-beck, customary international humanitarian law, vol.i, 60
(2009)




97. Brehm, supra note 78, 40.
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WALL detects individual and isolated threats,98 but it is unable to analyze
social or political factors to determine whether the State is engaged in an
armed conflict that would trigger the applicability of IHL or not.
III. The WALL must be dismantled and removed forthwith
Under international law, the State responsible for an internationally
wrongful act must fully repair the injury caused, 99 re-establishing the status
quo ante.100 Since the deployment of the WALL is attributable to Rasasal0 1
and constitutes an internationally wrongful act,"0 2 it must be dismantled and
removed forthwith.
C. THE COURT MAY ADJUDICATE ADAWA'S CLAIM THAT
RASASA'S IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS ON HELIAN PRODUCTS
FROM ADAWA VIOLATES THE CHC TREATY, AND ADAWA IS
ENTITLED TO COMPENSATORY DAMAGES REFLECTING THE
FINANCIAL HARM IT HAS SUFFERED TO DATE.
L The Court may adjudicate Adawa's claims
This Court may adjudicate Adawa's claim because: (i) the Crosinian
Helian Community Treaty ["CHC Treaty"] remains applicable as it has no
normative conflict with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
["GATT"]; and (ii) the Dispute Settlement Understanding ["DSU"] exclusive
jurisdiction does not prevent this Court from adjudicating disputes arising
from treaties other than the World Trade Organization ["WTO"] agreements.
a) THERE IS NO NORMATIVE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE GATT AND
THE CHC TREATY
The same international law issue may be regulated by more than one
98. SAF ¶24.
99. Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928, P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 13), 129;
Gabcikovo, supra note 21, ¶152; ARSI WA, supra note 61, Article 31.
100. ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 31.
101. ARSI WA, supra note 61, Article 2; Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of
a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 1.C.J. 62 (Apr. 29), 87.
102. ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 2.
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treaty.1 03 In this case, there is a presumption against normative conflict'04
and thus the interpretation which preserves the operation of the two treaties
must be followed.1 05 Indeed, there is a presumption that when creating new
obligations, States do not to derogate from their previous ones. 0 6 Only if a
normative conflict exists the principles of lexposteriori 07 and lex specialis'08
are applicable.'0 9
Under the CHC Treaty, Adawa and Rasasa agreed to impose no custom
duties on Helian products or related goods. Subsequently, both States
submitted zero bound rates for these same products under the GATT."' The
obligations assumed under both treaties are very similar to each other since
they both regulate Helian tariffs, thus the presumption against normative
conflict applies. This conclusion is further supported by Article XXIV of the
GATT, which permits the existence of regional trade agreements with similar
obligations,"' such as the CHC Treaty." 2
Since there is no normative conflict between the CHC Treaty and the
103. The Mox Plant Case, (Ire. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Request for Provisional Measures,
I.T.L.O.S. (Dec. 3) 2000, (Separate opinion of Judge Wolfrum), ["Mox Plant"], 131; Southern Bluefin
Tuna Case, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (Aus. N.Z. v. Jap.), 23 R.I.A.A. 1, 57, ["Southern
Bluefin Tuna"] 141(h).
104. Int'I Law Comm'n, Rep. of the Study Group of the International Law Commission,
Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, (2006), 37; 1. PAWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, HOW THE WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 240-241
(2003) ["PAWELYN"]; Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Por. v. Ind.) Judgement on Preliminary
Objections, 1957 I.C.J. (Nov. 26) 122.
105. O. CORTEN & P. KLEIN, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
COMMENTARY. VOLUME I 789 (2011); Panel Report, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/R, 31 May 199919.92-9.96; Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS64/R, 2 Jul. 1998 114.28.
106. R. JENNINGS ET AL (EDS.), OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1275 (1992).
107. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ["VCLT"],
Article 30(3).
108. Int'I Law Comm'n, Rep. of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law,
Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, (2006), 56; PAWELYN, supra note 104,385; ARSIWA
commentaries, supra note 36, 140; Nicaragua, supra note 46, 1274; Gabcikovo, supra note 21, 1132;
ARSI WA, supra note 61, Article 55.
109. Int'I Law Comm'n, Rep. of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law,
Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, (2006), 56, 230.
110. SAF112.
111. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
54U.N.T.S. 154, Annex 1.A, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, ["GATT"], Article XXIV.
112. SAF Clarification 5.
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GATT, both treaties are applicable over tariffs on Helian products.
b) THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS UNDER THE CHC
TREATY
Respondent may argue that Article 23(1) of the DSU prevents this Court
from adjudicating Adawa's claims. However, the WTO does not have the
monopoly over the settlement of trade disputes." 3
The Dispute Settlement Body ["DSB"] has exclusive jurisdiction only
over disputes arising from the "covered agreements","4 i.e. the treaties set
in Appendix 1 of the DSU." 5 No claims for the violation of international law
other than those set out in the covered agreements can be brought before a
WTO panel. Moreover, breaches of free trade agreements are adjudicated by
their own dispute settlement mechanisms."' Here, Adawa's claims arise
under the CHC Treaty,'" over which the DSB lacks jurisdiction. Thus, this
Courts has jurisdiction over such claims under Article VI of the Treaty of
Botega."g
II. Adawa's claim is admissible
a) THERE IS NO RULE OF LISPENDENS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
When the jurisdictions of two unrelated and independent tribunals
extend to the same dispute, there is no rule of international law preventing
them from exercising their jurisdiction." 9 International tribunals have only
refused to exercise jurisdiction pending a decision by another tribunal based
113. Panel Report, Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, WTO
Doc. WT/DS241/R, Apr. 22, 2003, ¶7.38.
114. PAWELYN, supra note 104, 444.
115. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
["DSU"].
116. Y. Lee, Regional Trade Agreements in the WTO System: Potential Issues and Solutions, 7
JOURNAL OF EAST ASIA AND INT'L LAW 353 (2015), 365; North American Free Trade Agreement, Jan.
1, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, Chapter Twenty; Protocolo de Olivos para la Soluci6n de controversias en el
MFRCOSUR, Feb. 18, 2002, 2251 U.N.T.S. 243; Agreement establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand Free Trade Area, Jan. 28, 1992, 2672 U.N.T.S.1-47529, Article 30
117. SAF161.C
118. Botega Treaty, Article VI.
119. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited V. Arab Republic of Egypt (Pyramids
Case), Decision on preliminary objections to jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3 (Nov. 27) 1985
["Southern Pacific Properties"], 184
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on comity 20 which has discretionary nature.'1 2  Accordingly, the fact that a
similar proceeding is taking place before the WTO12 2 does not render
Adawa's claim inadmissible.
b) ALTERNATIVELY, THERE IS NO LIS PENDENS IN THE PRESENT
CASE
Even if this Court considers lis pendens is binding under international
law, this rule is only applicable where there are identical parties, legal basis
and relief sought before tribunals of the same character.12 3  Here, these
requirements are not cumulatively met.
First, the actions do not have the same legal basis. A single State act
may violate more than one treaty2 4 since rights and obligations from
different conventional sources have a separate existence.12 5  Consequently,
actions arising from two different treaties have different causes of action.1 2 6
Here, the WTO Panel will deal with violations under GATT, while the ICJ
will address violations of the CHC Treaty.
Second, the relief sought is different. The relief before a WTO Panel is,
primarily, to put the measure in conformity with WTO law.'2 7 Exceptionally,
the DSB may authorize suspension of concessions or a compensation (which
is temporary, voluntary and proactive).12 1 Conversely, the relief sought
before this Court under the CHC Treaty concerns financial and retroactive
compensation under customary law.1 29
120. Southern Pacific Properties, supra note 119, ¶84; Mox Plant, supra note 103, ¶28.
121. J. CRAWFORD, CHANCE, ORDER, CHANGE: THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, GENERAL
COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (2014); Y. SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 261 (2003).
122. SAF ¶47.
123. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, (Qatar v. U.A.E) 2019 I.C.J (June 14) (Dissenting opinion of Judge ad-hoc Cot) ¶5;
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6 (Aug. 25) 20;
S.A.R.L Benvenuti & Bonfant v. People's Republic of the Congo, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2
(Dec. 15) 1977 ¶1.14
124. Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 103,152; Mox Plant, supra note 103, 131.
125. Mox Plant, supra note 103, ¶50.
126. J. Pawelyn, et. al, Forum Shopping before International Tribunals: Real Concerns,
Impossible Solutions, 42 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 77 (2009), 110.
127. C. Amerasinghe,jurisdiction of specific international tribunals 507 (2009); DSU, supra note
115, Article 22 (1).
128. DSU, supra note 155, Article 22 (1).
129. ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 36(1).
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Finally, the tribunals have a different character. The DSB is a quasi-
judicial or quasi- adjudicative body 30 while the ICJ is a judicial organ.' 3 '
Consequently, Adawa's claim is admissible.
II. Rasasa's imposition of tariffs on Helian products is inconsistent
with the CHC Treaty.
a) THE IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS VIOLATES ARTICLE 3 OF THE CHC
TREATY
Pursuant to Article 3 of the CHC Treaty, members of the Community
agreed to impose no custom duties on Helian products and related goods.
Accordingly, Rasasa's imposition of tariffs violates this Article.
b) ARTICLE 22(B) IS NOT SELF-JUDGING
When States intend to exclude judicial revision from measures
importing non- compliance with a treaty, they do so expressly.' 3 2 For this
purpose, they specifically include the wording "it considers" or "the State
considers".1 33
Article 22(b) cannot be interpreted as being self-judging because it lacks
the words "it considers". Thus, Rasasa's actions are susceptible of judicial
revision by this Court.
c) RASASA CANNOT RELY ON ARTICLE 22(B) AS A JUSTIFICATION
FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
Rasasa cannot invoke Article 22(b) of the CHC Treaty in orderto justify
the imposition of tariffs given that (i) its essential security interests were not
threatened or, alternatively (ii) the measures taken were not necessary.
130. E. Ramirez Robles, political & quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement models in european
union free trade agreements Is the quasi-adjudicative model a trend or is it just another model?, ERSD-
2006-09, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division Working Paper (2006) 3.
131. ICJ Statute, supra note 3, Article 1.
132. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, May.
12, 2005, ¶370, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International INC. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on liability, Oct. 3 2006, 1213 ["LG&E"]; CC/Devas
(Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited., and Telcom Devas Mauritius Limited v.
The Republic of India, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2013-09, (Jul. 25,
2016), ¶219.
133. Nicaragua, supra note 46, ¶222.
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(i) Rasasa's economic crisis does not fulfill the threshold of
Article 22(b)
The concept of essential security interests refers to the quintessential
functions of the State, namely the protection of its territory and population,
and the maintenance of public order. 3 4 Economic crisis have only been
deemed as threatening essential security interests in situations where the
State endures large portion of the population below the poverty line,
widespread unrest, disturbances with risk of insurrection, breakdown of
government and political institutions, 35 which would cause the whole State's
economic foundation to be under siege.1 36
Here, the decline in the Helian production, and the mere prospect of a
future economic crisis,137 are not menaces to Rasasa's essential security
interests. Contrarily, the tariffs were driven by a protectionist intent, since
mere sectorial difficulties1 38 cannot reach the threshold of a threat to an
essential security interest.
(ii) In any event, the measures taken were not necessary
Measures are "necessary" if they are objectively required in order to
achieve the protection of an essential security interest and States do not have
any other reasonable alternatives less in conflict or more compliant with its
international obligations.' 9
Rasasa's justification for the measure was the prospect of economic
collapse in five or ten years.1 40 For such a long period of time, unilateral
imposition of tariff seems hardly the only alternative. Contrary, rather a more
progressive approach with the inclusion of all the Helian community and in
compliance with the mere purpose of the CHC Treaty would have been
preferred.
134. Panel Report, Russia - Measures concerning traffic in transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R
(Apr. 5, 2019) ¶7.130.
135. Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 Sep. 5
2008 ¶180.
136. LG&E, supra note 132, ¶238.
137. SAF ¶30, 44.
138. SAF ¶30.
139. Deutsche Telekom AG v. The Republic of India, Interim Award, UNCITRAL PCA Case No.
2014-10 (Dec. 13) 2017 ¶239.
140. SAF ¶30.
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IV. Additionally, Rasasa cannot allege a state of necessity.
States may not allege state of necessity as a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness if it seriously impairs an essential interest of another State.14 1
By imposing tariffs on the Helian hyacinth, Rasasa seriously impaired
Adawa's essential interests. Rasasa caused grave damages to Adawan
farmers, with estimated losses of more than E10 million in revenue.42 That
will only continue to increase in the upcoming years. 13 Therefore, Rasasa
cannot plea necessity.
V. Adawa is entitled to compensatory damages derivedfrom Rasasa's
violation of its obligations.
States must compensate for any material loss caused by their breaches
of international law. 4 4 By imposing tariffs on Helian products, Rasasa has
committed an internationally wrongful act 4 5 and owes compensation to
Adawa on behalf of the Adawan farmers that suffered direct financial losses
estimated in E10 million.1 4 6
D. THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF DARIAN GREY WERE
CONSISTENT WITH ADAWA'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND ADAWA MAY PROCEED TO
RENDER HER TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
I. Ms. Grey does not enjoy immunity under international law.
Respondent may argue that Ms. Grey enjoys personal immunity under
the CHC Treaty or customary law. However, such alleged immunities are
not applicable since (i) there is a customary exception with respect to
prosecution by international courts, (ii) the jus cogens nature of the
prohibition of war crimes overrides immunity, and, alternatively (iii) her
appointment constituted an abuse of rights.
141. ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 25(b); Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 15, 1140; J.
CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART, 313-314 (2013).
142. SAF143.
143. SAF143.
144. Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment on Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J (Ser. A) N" 8 (Jul.
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a) IMMUNITIES ARE UNAVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO
PROSECUTION BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
Under international customary law, there is an exception to immunities
of public officials with respect to prosecution by international courts. 47 State
practice is evidenced by the adherence to the Charter of the Nurembergl4 and
Tokyo 49 Tribunals, the Nuremberg Principles, 5 0 the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ["ICTY"] Statute,"' the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute 52 and the Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind.153 Opinio juris can be found in
Security Council resolutions 5 4 and submissions to the United Nations
Secretary-General. 55
This customary exception is recognized in judicial decisions issued by
the International Military Tribunal ofNuremberg, 56 the ICTY, 57 the Special
147. The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re AI-Bashir Appeal, I.C.C.
The Appeals Chamber, May. 6, 2019 ["AI-Bashir AC"] ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2 ¶103-113; The Prosecutor
v. AI-Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re AI-Bashir Appeal, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges
Eboe-Osuji, Morrison, Hofmanski and Bossa, I.C.C. The Appeals Chamber, May. 6, 2019, ICC-02/05-
01/09 OA2 ¶¶65-174.
148. Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Aug. 8, 1945, Article 7.
149. International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter, Jan. 19, 1946, Article 6.
150. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in
the Judgment of the Tribunal adopted by the I LC at its second Sess., annexed to G.A. Res. 488, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/488 (Dec. 12, 1950), Principle Ili.
151. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May. 25, 1993,
Article 7(2).
152. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
NOV. 8, 1994 (UN DOC S/RES/955(1994), ANNEX, (1994), ARTICLE 6(2).
153. Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, Report
of the ILC 48th sess., GAOF, 510 Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/51/10) 17, Article 7.
154. S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000); S.C. Res. 1564 (Sep. 18, 2004); S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31,
2005); S.C. Res. 827 (May. 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
155. S.C. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolutions 808 (May. 3, 1993), S/25704, 153; United Nations Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-
General, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)', S/25704, May. 3, 1993, 14;
S.C., Final report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in accordance with Security
Council resolution 935 (1994), Doc. No S/1994/1405, ¶¶171-173; GA. Res. 596, Memorandum by the
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/596 (Mar. 31, 2008), ¶141-142, 150.
156. The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military
Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Oct. 1, 1946 156.
157. The Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions, I.C.T.Y. The Trial
Chamber, Nov. 8, 2001 ¶28; The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision on the objection of the Republic of
Croatia to the issuance of subpoenae duces tecum, I.C.T.Y. The Trial Chamber, Jul. 17, 1997 ¶89.
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Court for Sierra Leone 58 and the International Criminal Court ["ICC"]. 159
Further, in the Arrest warrant case, this Court expressly identified
prosecution by the ICC as an exception to personal immunity.1 60  Scholars
also confirm the existence of this rule. 16'
In the present case, Adawa executed an arrest warrant issued by the
ICC.1 62 Hence, Ms. Grey cannot invoke immunities and her arrest163 was
consistent with international law.
b) IMMUNITIES ARE OVERRIDDEN BY THE JUS COGENS STATUS OF
WAR CRIMES
The prohibition of war crimes is ajus cogens norm.1" To give proper
effect to this hierarchically higher status, not only contrary substantive rules
158. The Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, S.C.S.L. The Appeals
Chamber, May. 31, 2004, SCSL-03-01-I-059152.
159. Al-Bashir AC, supra note 147, ¶¶113,115,117; The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Corrigendum to
the Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to
Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, I.C.C. The Pre-Trial Chamber !, Dec. 13, 2011, ICC-02/05-01/09 ["Al-
Bashir Malawi"] 143.
160. Arrest Warrant of Arp. 11, 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Bel) 2002 I.C.J. 3 (14 Feb) ["Arrest
Warrant"] 161.
161. The Prosecutor v. AI-Bashir, Observations by Professor Paola Gaeta as amicus curiae on
the merits of the legal questions presented in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's appeal against the
'Decision under Article 87 (7) of the Rome Statute on the non- compliance by Jordan with the request by
the Court for the arrest and surrender [of] Omar Al-Bashir' of Mar. 12, 2018, The Appeals Chamber
I.C.C., Jun. 18, 2018, ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, 110/6; The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Observations by
Professor Claus KreB as amicus curiae on the merits of the legal questions presented in the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan's appeal against the 'Decision under Article 87 (7) of the Rome Statute on the non-
compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender [of] Omar AI-Bashir' of
Mar. 12, 2018, The Appeals Chamber I.C.C., Jun. 18, 2018, ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, ["Claus KreB"]
¶15; Concepci6n Escobar HernAndez (Special Rapporteur on immunity of State officials from foreign
criminal jurisdiction), Fifth report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/701 (Jun. 14, 2016) 1189; The Prosecutor v. Taylor, Observations by Professor Philippe
Sands as amicus curiae on the merits of the legal questions presented in the SCSL The Appeals Chamber,
Oct. 23, 2003, CASE SCSL-2003- 01-1,12.
162. SAF 148, 50.
163. SAF ¶51.
164. Mi CHERIF BASSIOUNI, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996) 63; Al-Bashir AC, supra note 147, 1123; D. Tladi (Special
Rapporteur on peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens)), Third report on peremptory
norms of general international law (jus cogens), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/714 (Feb. 12, 2018), ¶114; The
Prosecutor v. Kupregkid et al., Judgment, I.C.T.Y. The Trial Chamber, Jan. 8, 2000 1520; Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 88, 179.
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but also rules which prevent its enforcement are overridden,' 65 including
rules on immunity.1 66 This is justified by the need to combat impunity for
international crimes.1 67 Respondent could not argue that the findings in
Germany v. Italy168 are applicable, since that case did not deal with
immunities of public officials.' 69
Ms. Grey is accused of having committed war crimes.1 70  The higher
status of the prohibition of such crimes overrides any immunity she may
otherwise enjoy. Accordingly, her arrest was consistent with international
law.
c) IMMUNITIES ARE LIFTED UNDER THE ABUSE OF RIGHTS
PRINCIPLE
The principle of abuse of rights prohibits the exercise of a prerogative
for a purpose it was not intended, such as the obtention of an undue
advantage.171 It is a general principle of law recognized by civil law 72 and
165. S. I. Strong, General Principles of Procedural Law and Procedural Jus Cogens, 122 PENN
ST. L. REV. 347 (2018) 394,404.
166. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 l.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14)
(Dissenting opinion of Al-khasawneh), 17; K. PARLET, Immunity in civil proceedings for torture: the
emerging exception, in R. A. Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur on immunity of State officials from foreign
criminal jurisdiction), Second report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631 (Jun. 10, 2010),163; Case of Al- Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of Judges Rozakis And Caflisch Joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barrcto And Vaji6, t
No. 35763/97 E.Ct.H.R. (Nov. 21, 2001), 13; Case of AI-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Dissenting
Opinion Judge Ferrari Bravo, No.35763/97 E.Ct.H. R. (Nov. 21,2001)33; Case ofAl-Adsani v. The United
Kingdom, Dissenting Opinion ofJudge Loucaides, No. 35763/97 E.Ct.H.R. (Nov. 21, 2001), 34.
167. R. A. Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal
jurisdiction), Second report on immunity of State oficials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/631 (Jun. 10, 2010), 156; Concepci6n Escobar Hern.ndez (Special Rapporteur on immunity of
State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction), Fifth report on immunity of State officials from foreign
criminaljurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/701 (Jun. 14, 2016) ¶193; G.A. Res. 67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/1,
(Nov. 30, 2012),122.
168. Jurisdictional immunities of the State (Ger. v. Ita.), 2012 I.C.J (Feb. 3).
169. Jurisdictional immunities of the State (Ger. v. Ita.), 2012 I.C.J (Feb. 3) ¶91.
170. SAF Correction 1.
171. Case concerning Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Eq. Guinea v. Fr.), Preliminary
Objections of France I.C.J., Mar. 30, 2017 176.
172. Netherlands - Civil Code, Articles 1-2; Switzerland - Code Civil, Article 2, Dec. 10, 1907,
SR 210, RS 210; Argentina - C6digo Civil y Comercial, Article 10; Germany - Civil Code, § 226, 242;
Israel - Contract Law (General Part), Article 12; Turkey - Civil Code, Article 18; Greece - Civil Code,
Article 281; Japan - Constitution, Article 12.
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common law jurisdictions.17' It is corollary to the principle of good faith and
pacta sunt servanda, enshrined in the VCLT17 4 and recognized by this
Court.'17
Particularly, public officials are vested with immunities to guarantee an
efficient performance of their public prerogatives. However, an abusive
exercise of immunities would allow officials to obtain an undue advantage
by eluding their responsibility. 176
The ICC Prosecutor opened an investigation in 2009177 and expressly
cited Ms. Grey as responsible for RRC's unlawful activities in Garantia. 7 8
Rasasa was aware of this ongoing investigation and the serious allegations
against Ms. Grey' 79 but nonetheless appointed her as Minister of Foreign
Affairs 180 with the purpose of preventing her arrest. Hence, her appointment
constitutes an abuse of rights which cannot be upheld by this Court.
II. Adawa acted under the aut dedere aut judicare principle.
Under the Geneva Conventions, States are obliged to prosecute or
extradite alleged perpetrators of grave breaches of the Conventions.' 8 1
According to the VCLT, treaties shall be interpreted considering the
173. M. Byers, Abuse of rights: An old Principle, a new age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389 (2002) 396-
397.
174. VCLT, supra note 107, Article 26.
175. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)No. 6
(Aug. 25) 130; Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 l.C.J. (Dec. 18) 1142; Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment,
1970 L.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) 156; Nuclear Tests (Austr. V. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. (Dec. 20), 146;
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. And
Herz. v. Yug.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. (Jul. 11), 146.
176. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Beig.) 2002 I.C.J. (Feb. 14)
(Dissenting opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert) 121; Case concerning Immunities and Criminal





181. Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed
forces in the field, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, Article 49; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 85, Article 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Article 129; Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in
time of war 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Article 146; j. M. HENCKAERTS & L. DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOL. 1, 608 (2009).
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subsequent practice in their application, as it reflects the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation.182 States have applied this provision from
the Geneva Conventions to all serious violations of humanitarian law,
including war crimes committed in NIACs.1 83
The obligation to extradite arises when the State in custody of the
alleged offender evades its duty to prosecute'8 4 and it can be discharged by
surrendering the alleged violators to a competent international criminal
court.185
Here, both Adawa and Rasasa are parties to the Geneva Conventions of
1949.1 86 Ms. Grey is suspected of having committed serious violations of
international humanitarian law, and Rasasa expressed its unwillingness to
prosecute her.1 87 Hence, her arrest for the purpose of surrendering her to the
ICC was consistent with Adawa's aut dedere autjudicare obligation.
III. Alternatively, Adawa had to execute the arrest warrant
notwithstanding conflicting obligations.
Even if this Court considers that Adawa was under an obligation to
respect Ms. Grey's immunity, Adawa's obligation to execute the arrest
warrant must prevail. The ICC is the sole authority to decide over its judicial
182. VCLT, supra note 107, Article 31(3)(b).
183. The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Oct. 2, 1995, (Case No. IT-94-1-T); The Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Submission of the Government of the United States of America Concerning Certain Arguments Made by
Counsel for the Accused in the Case of The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Tadic, Jul. 17, 1995, (Case No.
IT-94-1-T) ¶35-36; The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal onJurisdiction, Oct. 2, 1995, (CaseNo. IT-94-1-T); S.C. Res. 978 (Feb. 27,1995);
S.C. Res. 1193 (Aug. 28, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199 (Sep. 23, 1998); Commission on Human Rights Res.
1991/1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167 ¶2; A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 88 (2008); J. M.
HENCKAERTS, Customary International Humanitarian Law: a response to US Comments, 89
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 473 (2007) 476; 1. M. HENCKAERTS & L. DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOL. I, 609 (2009); Germany, Humanitarian Law in
Armed Conflicts - Manual, DSK VV207320067 (1992), Section 1209; Belgium, Loi relative A la
repression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire of Jun. 16, 1993, Moniteur Belge,
Official Gazette of Belgium; Switzerland - Code P6nal Militaire, Jun. 13, 1927, RS 321.0, Article I11;
United Nations, 18 U.S. Code §2441 - War crimes; i. M. HENCKAERTS & L. DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, VOL. 1, 609 (2009).
184. K. KITrICHAISAREE, THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE, 3(2018).
185. K. KITTICtIAISAREE, THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE, 5 (2018); Int'lLaw
Comm', Rep. of its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/69/10, (2014), 153-154; 1. M. HENCKAERTS & L.
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functions,' including questions concerning cooperation and assistance.1 89 It
has exclusive competence to determine whether a request to cooperate could
place a State in a situation of conflicting obligations.'0 States do not have
the discretion to dispense with such request nor to refuse to execute an arrest
warrant. 91
Respondent may argue that Adawa should have informed the ICC of an
impediment to the execution of the arrest warrant.1 9 2  However,
consultations have no suspensive effect1 93 and arrest warrants remain valid
until they are explicitly withdrawn or suspended by the ICC.1 94 Therefore,
States cannot reject its obligation of cooperation on the grounds of a
disagreement with the ICC,195 especially in cases where its execution could
succeed only in a narrow window of time.1 96
In this case, Adawa was obliged to comply with the arrest warrant issued
by the ICC, especially considering that Ms. Grey was expected to be in
Adawan territory for only two days.1 97
IV. In the further alternative, Adawa acted as an agent of the ICC.
International criminal jurisdictions rely on the cooperation of the States
188. The Prosecutor v. AI-Bashir, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir's Arrest and Surrender to the Court, I.C.C. The Pre- Trial Chamber
II, April. 9, 2014, 1CC-02/05-01/09 116; AI-Bashir Malawi, supra note 159, 111.
189. O. TRIFFTERER & K. AMBOS, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT.
A COMMENTARY 2277 (2015).
190. M. BERGSMO & L. YAN, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 234
(2012).
191. The Prosecutor v. AI-Bashir, Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-
compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar AI-Bashir,
I.C.C. The Pre-Trial Chamber II, Jul. 6, 2017, ICC-02/05-01/09 ¶104,106; AI-Bashir AC, supra note 147,
¶152.
192. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), Jul. 17, 1998, U.N.
General Assembly ["Rome Statute"], Article 97.
193. The Prosecutor v. AI-Bashir, Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-
compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar AI-Bashir,
I.C.C. The Pre-Trial Chamber 11, Jul. 6, 2017, ICC-02/05-0l/09 ["AI-Bashir South Africa"] 1119; The
Prosecutor v. A]-Bashir, Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by
Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender or Omar AI-Bashir, I.C.C. The Pre-Trial
Chamber II, Dec. I1, 2017, ICC-02/05- 01/09 ["AI-Bashir Jordan"] ¶48.
194. AI-Bashir South Africa, supra note 193, ¶120.
195. AI-Bashir South Africa, supra note 193, 1104.
196. AI-Bashir Jordan, supra note 193,148.
197. SAF 149.
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to enforce their decisions, 198 since States are instruments for the enforcement
of the international community's jus puniendi.199. Therefore, when the ICC
issues an arrest warrant, the requested States are not exercising its own
jurisdiction over a suspect but acting as a mere agent of the Court.200
Here, Adawa was acting as a mere agent of the ICC complying with an
arrest warrant and not under its own national criminal jurisdiction.
Therefore, no responsibility can be attributed to Adawa over Ms. Grey's
arrest.
V. Adawa may proceed to render Ms. Grey to the ICC.
Since the arrest and detention of Ms. Grey was consistent with
international law,2 0' Adawa may proceed to render her to the ICC.
E. PRAYER OF RELIEF
Therefore, it may please the Court to adjudge and declare that:
I) It has jurisdiction over Adawa's claims because Adawa is a party to
the 1929 Treaty of Botega;
I) Rasasa's development and deployment of the WALL along the
border between Adawa and Rasasa is in violation of international law, and
order that the WALL be dismantled and removed forthwith;
III) It may adjudicate Adawa's claim that Rasasa's imposition of
tariffs on Helian products from Adawa violates the CHC Treaty, and that
Adawa is entitled to compensatory damages reflecting the financial harm it
has suffered to date, such amount to be determined in subsequent
proceedings; and
IV) The arrest and detention of Darian Grey were consistent with
Adawa's obligations under international law, and that Adawa may proceed
to render her to the International Criminal Court.
198. Claus KreB, supra note 161, 117.
199. AI-Bashir Malawi, supra note 159, ¶46.
200. The Prosecutor v. AI-Bashir, Prosecution Response to the Observations of the African
Union and the League of Arab States, I.C.C. The Appeals Chamber, Aug. 14, 2018, ICC- 02/05-01/09
OA2 ¶11,12.
201. Supra §(IV)(A)-(B)-(C)&(D).
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